What do we see if we dance? What do we feel when we dancing? Who are we when we are part of an enactment of dancing? The occurrence of dance brings to the key ideas about the nature of human meaning-making, the function of our basically corporeal actions on the planet, and the foundational aspects of our encounters. Dance, I argue, holds immense promise as an object for research in addition to a subject of study — that is, a source of insight in itself, shedding light on life, movement, and significance. In investigating dance thusly, I expect to reveal the importance of perspective. 1 way to understand dancing is because a study of perspective — the views of the dancers, of the audience, and of their choreographer; the views of an engaged party and of a detached observer; the viewpoints from beneath the skin from outside, from within and from without.
Man Always Danced
It lets us see dance not only as a pan-cultural occurrence, but one which is foundationally human. What about the character of the human kind makes it possible for this? Contrary to other arts, dancing leaves no hint, no album. It’s the artwork that’s contained completely and entirely from the present. It’s simply fully present in the moment of its production. It provides you no manuscripts to keep off, no paintings to reveal in to hang on walls, zero traces of words to be published and marketed — nothing but the fleeting instant manifest in its own unfolding.
The disposition of dancing itself is written to the individual form. Bipedalism enables exceptionally substantial levels of biomechanical liberty. The chances for motion are only more numerous. Bipedal bodies possess more unconstrained components, parts which are freely transferring or which possess the capability to move. Having but two appendages inhabited in a fundamental position posture leaves the remainder with holding the weight of their body upward. These may proceed independent of the aid of their physiological back, as in bending or extending the arms. Upright torsos will also be positionally unconstrained from the simple fact they are partially self-supporting. Upright positionality also permits for level of liberty from the weighting, moving, and casting of their legs, like in kicking or wheeling a leg around. Quadrapedal creatures can surely move about in various gaits — both the gallops and trots of a horse, for instance — but they’re physiologically restricted by the best need to encourage a horizontally elongated chest, a spinal column that’s directly attached to the quadrapedal arrangement of motion.
A body arrangement consequently allows for greater degrees of freedom from the sense and expressive too. The individual form allows for choice in the palette of possibilities for motion. An examination of the way the human form uses the caliber of movement to make purposeful forms will likely be the goal of this paper.
Assessing the question of meaning emerges from dancing, we must turn first to the question of how emotion and motion hang together. In traditional cognitivist theories of mind (Fodor, 1975), theorists hold to the Cartesian notion that an emotional state is separated physically and functionally from its expression in the physiological form. Within this perspective, emotions are regarded as internal states or processes, wherein the environment is conceived of just insofar as supplying stimulation and getting actions.
Griffiths and Scarantino (2008) propose an enactive, situated view of emotion that offers a contrasting place: that”internal” bodily influence and”outside” expression are of the identical piece. This springs from the insight that emotion is, above all, for something. Emotion is to be defined in a social context; afer all, people are, by their nature, social creatures. It follows then, that an emotional expression might be weaker or even directed toward this conclusion. This, termed the”audience impact”, is readily observable in scenarios of this Duchenne smile, the configuration of their eyes and mouth termed to an expression of real happiness (as compared with a grin delivered just with the mouth). Fernández-Dols and Ruiz-Belda (1997) observe that professional bowlers seldom smile after attaining a complete, ten-pin strike when facing their partners; they grin more often when confronting their companies, even after knocking down only a few hooks.
Emotional expressions, then, are not the outpourings of an emotional state that are only observed by witnesses, they are integral to the nature of the emotive action — the action of a tactical move in a social context. If the reader knows child rearing, this squares with the everyday situation of surreptitiously celebrating a baby who, after having a trivial bump or fall, begins to shout and, upon looking around and finding no adult around, calms immediately and proceeds to play contentedly. The behaviour of sulking is one of trying certain transactional benefits in a social connection. In locating the possibility of a beneficial trade impossible, the emotive celebrity must rethink whether or not his or her emotive activities are worth job.
This isn’t the place being argued here. As private experience can attest, we can experience emotion and produce emotional expression when alone is uncontested. However, the situationist method of emotion does not see such cases as pragmatically or functionally equivalent to this
Instances where it does not play itself out as a fundamentally social experience. The goal of the situationist perspective could be seen as changing the framing of this dialogue about emotion. As opposed to taking the event of a lone rock climber hanging precariously on the edge of a precipice as the paradigmatic case of dread, the situationist takes instead the case of a young child expressing distress when her caretaker is close.
Furthermore, this perspective argues that emotive actions aren’t conceived of or”cognitively processed” as propositional states. Under the standard cognitivist perspective, the contents of any psychological condition has to be expressible in terms of a propositional attitude: the thought that”A is F.” This perspective holds that all productive thoughts must be systematically organized in this way. In complex tasks, like cooking a meal or navigating a crowded road crossing, we utilize patterns and thought of activity which are non-conceptual and instead regulated by physical attunement, social standards, abilities, and situational context. In this view, the ability to emote isn’t characterized primarily by the ability to produce abstract theoretical judgments and inferences, but by the ability to navigate a social situation by using the range of activities given in a psychological state. An outrageous and counterintuitive result of embracing the cognitivist perspective is that young babies and non-human animals do not have real feelings to talk of.
The simple fact that emotion, and lots of elements of cognitive sense-making, are not conceptual and abstract are put out in Johnson’s (2007) Meaning of the Body. There, he argues that even conceptual ideas are, and have to be, based in embodied motion as well as the aesthetic characteristics of experience. This account is opposed to that of Fodor and people like him. Johnson’s opinion is nonrepresentationalist and doesn’t divide body and mind. Under Johnson’s perspective, experience structures meaning in that it has its bases in dynamic organism-environment couplings, situation- and goal-dependent values, pragmatic concerns, social interaction, and embodied feeling. These are traces of effect, causation, and interdependence that cross borders of brain, body, and world. Notice how Johnson’s summary easily confirms Griffiths and Scarantino’s views of emotion as completely actions -, goal-, and also interaction-oriented.